INTRODUCTION
Military technology is a field driven by change -the constant pursuit to be better, faster, stronger. Certain technological achievements like guns and planes have happened in the purview of the public and have revolutionized the world of war as we know it. Yet many technological changes have occurred under the radar, in military labs and private test fields, with the majority of citizens unaware of the leaps and bounds of progress. Robotics is one such modern military technology advancement that has largely escaped public attention to date. Combining the most advanced electronic, computer, surveillance and weapons technologies, the robots of today have extraordinary capabilities and are quickly changing the landscape of battle and dynamics of war. One of the most important achievements has been the creation of robots with autonomous decision-making capability. 2 force, known as lethal autonomous robots ("LARs") has significant implications for the military and society.
A variety of never before anticipated complex legal, ethical and political issues have been created; issues in need of prompt attention and action. There have recently been growing calls for the potential risks and impacts of LARs to be considered and addressed in an anticipatory and preemptive manner. For example, in October 2010, A United Nations human rights investigator recommended in a report to the United Nations that " [t] he international community urgently needs to address the legal, political, ethical and moral implications of the development of lethal robotic technologies." 3 In September 2010, a workshop of experts on unmanned military systems held in Berlin issued a statement (supported by a majority but not all of the participants) calling upon "the international community to commence a discussion about the pressing dangers that these systems pose to peace and international security and to civilians…." 4 While there is much room for debate about what substantive policies and restrictions (if any) should apply to LARs, there is broad agreement that now is the time to discuss those issues. The recent controversy over unmanned aerial vehicles ("UAVs") that are nevertheless human-controlled (often referred to as "drones") demonstrates the importance of anticipating and trying to address in a proactive manner the concerns about the next generation of such weapons, autonomous lethal robotics. 5 This article seeks to provide a background of some of these issues and start the much needed legal and ethical dialogue related to the use of lethal autonomous robotic technologies in the military context. The next part (Part II) of this article provides a brief history and illustrations of autonomous robots in the military, including the pending development of LARs. Part III sets forth a number of important ethical and policy considerations regarding the use of robots in military endeavors. Part IV reviews the current patchwork of guidelines and policies that apply to the use of military robots. Part V considers the role that international treaties and agreements might play in the governance of LARs, while Part VI investigates the potential role of soft law governance mechanisms such as codes of conduct.
II. BACKGROUND ON AUTONOMOUS MILITARY ROBOTICS
In the United States there has been a long tradition of applying innovative technology in the battlefield that has often translated into military success. 6 Force multiplication -with robots, fewer soldiers are needed for a given mission, and an individual soldier can now do the job of what took many before. The Department of Defense ("DOD") naturally extended this approach to robotics. Primary motivators for the use of intelligent robotic or unmanned systems in the battlefield include:
Expanding the battlespace -robots allow combat to be conducted over larger areas than was previously possible. 6 Material from this section is derived with permission from Arkin, supra note 2. devices can each be considered to be robotic by some definitions, as they all are capable of sensing their environment and actuating, in these cases through the application of lethal force. In 2001, Congress issued a mandate that stated that by 2010 one-third of all U.S. deep strike aircraft should be unmanned and by 2015 one-third of all ground vehicles should be likewise unmanned. 12 More recently, the United States Department of Defense ("DOD") issued in December 2007 an Unmanned Systems Roadmap spanning 25 years, reaching until 2032, that likewise anticipated and projected a major shift toward greater reliance on unmanned vehicles in U.S. military operations. 13 As early as the end of World War I, the precursors of autonomous unmanned weapons appeared in a project on unpiloted aircraft conducted by the U.S. Navy and the 12 Adams, supra note 8, at 57-58. 13 U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Unmanned Systems Roadmap: 2007-2032 (2007) , available at http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/usroadmap2007.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
Sperry Gyroscope Company.
14 Multiple unmanned robotic systems are already being developed or are in use that employ lethal force such as the ARV (Armed Robotic Vehicle), a component of the Future Combat System ("FCS"); Predator UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) equipped with hellfire missiles, which have already been used in combat but under direct human supervision; and the development of an armed platform for use in the Korean Demilitarized Zone to name a few. 15 The TALON SWORDS platform (Figure 3 ) developed by Foster-Miller/QinitiQ has already been put to test in Iraq and Afghanistan and is capable of carrying lethal weaponry (M240 or M249 machine guns, or a Barrett .50 Caliber rifle). Three of these platforms have already served for over a year in Iraq and as of April 2008 and were still in the field at the time, contrary to some unfounded rumors. 16 A newer version, referred to as MAARS (Modular Advanced Armed Robotic System), is ready to replace the earlier SWORDS platforms in the field. The newer robot can carry a 40mm grenade launcher or an M240B machine gun in addition to various non-lethal weapons. The President of QinitiQ stated the purpose of the robot is to "enhance the warfighter's capability and lethality, extend his situational awareness and provide all these capabilities across the spectrum of combat." 17 14 Adams, supra note 8, at 57. 15 See Arkin, supra note 2, at 10. It is interesting to note that soldiers have already surrendered to unmanned aerial vehicles ("UAVs") even when the aircraft has been unarmed. The first documented instance of this occurred during the 1991 Gulf War. An RQ-2A Pioneer UAV, used for battle damage assessment for shelling originating from the USS Wisconsin, was flying toward Faylaka Island, when several Iraqis hoisted makeshift white flags to surrender, thus avoiding another shelling from the battleship. 18 Anecdotally, most UAV units during this conflict experienced variations of attempts to surrender to the Pioneer. A logical assumption is that this trend will only increase as UAVs' direct response ability and firepower increases.
The development of autonomous lethal robotics raises questions regarding if and how these systems can conform as well or better than our soldiers with respect to adherence to the existing Laws of War. This is no simple task however. In the fog of war it is hard enough for a human to be able to effectively discriminate whether or not a target is legitimate. Fortunately for a variety of reasons, it may be anticipated, despite the current state of the art, that in the future autonomous robots may be able to perform better than humans under these conditions, for the following reasons: • The ability to act conservatively: i.e., they do not need to protect themselves in cases of low certainty of target identification. Autonomous armed robotic vehicles do not need to have self-preservation as a foremost drive, if at all. They can be used in a selfsacrificing manner if needed and appropriate without reservation by a commanding officer.
• The eventual development and use of a broad range of robotic sensors better equipped for battlefield observations than humans' currently possess.
• They can be designed without emotions that cloud their judgment or result in anger and frustration with ongoing battlefield events. In addition, "Fear and hysteria are always latent in combat, often real, and they press us toward fearful measures …." 20 Autonomous agents need not suffer similarly.
• Avoidance of the human psychological problem of "scenario fulfillment" is possible, a factor believed partly contributing to the downing of an Iranian Airliner by the USS Vincennes in 1988. 21 This phenomena leads to distortion or neglect of contradictory information in stressful situations, where humans use new incoming information in ways that only fit their pre-existing belief patterns, a form of premature cognitive closure. Robots can be developed so that they are not vulnerable to such patterns of behavior.
• Robots can integrate more information from more sources far faster before responding with lethal force than a human possibly could in real-time. This data can arise from multiple remote sensors and intelligence (including human) sources, as part of the Army's network-centric warfare concept and the concurrent development of the Global Information Grid.
22 "Military systems (including weapons) now on the horizon will be too fast, too small, too numerous and will create environments too complex for humans to direct."
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• When working in a team of combined human soldiers and autonomous systems as an organic asset, they have the potential capability of independently and objectively monitoring ethical behavior in the battlefield by all parties and reporting infractions that might be observed. This presence alone might possibly lead to a reduction in human ethical infractions.
The trend is clear: warfare will continue and autonomous robots will ultimately be deployed in the conduct of warfare. The ethical and policy implications of this imminent development are discussed next, followed by a discussion of governance options. 20 
III. ETHICAL AND POLICY ASPECTS
There are numerous ethical, policy and legal issues relating to creation and deployment of lethal autonomous robots. Although an exhaustive list of these issues will not be offered here, a number of the key ones will be outlined. Rather than defending a particular point of view on the technology, the primary aim is to promote awareness of these issues and to encourage lawyers, policymakers, and other relevant stakeholders to consider what may be appropriate legal and regulatory responses to LARs as they are being developed.
A.
Responsibility and Risks
Australian philosopher Robert Sparrow has been a prominent voice in debates about the ethics of lethal autonomous robots. For instance, he examines the complexities associated with assigning ethical and legal responsibility to someone, or something, if an autonomous robot commits a war crime. 24 He considers several possible solutions to this puzzle, including "the programmer", "the commanding officer", and "the machine" itself but concludes that each option has its profound share of difficulties. 25 Remaining neutral on whether Sparrow is correct, assigning responsibility to a LAR's behavior (or misbehavior) is an important matter that warrants further investigation. Along related lines, Peter Asaro doubts whether a robot can be punished in a meaningful way since it is unlikely to possess any form of moral agency; observing that traditional notions from criminal law such as "rehabilitation" and "deterrence" do not seem applicable here.
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One of the principal justifications for relying on autonomous robots is that they would have access to a greater amount of information than any human soldier. Yet this advantage raises key questions, including whether a robot should ever be permitted to refuse an order and, if so, under what conditions. Refusing an order on the battlefield is of course a serious matter, but should a robot be given more latitude to do so than a human soldier?
Battlefield units containing human soldiers and LARs will raise additional ethical issues relating to risk and responsibility. According to Sparrow, "human beings will start to be placed in harm's way as a result of the operations of robots." 27 But will soldiers genuinely be aware of the kinds of risks they are being exposed to when working with robotic counterparts? If not, Sparrow fears that soldiers might be place too much trust in a machine, assuming, for example, it has completed its assigned tasks. 28 And even if soldiers are fully aware of the risks associated with reliance on robotics, how much additional risk exposure is justifiable?
B. Legal Status of Civilians
In any treatment of LARs, the question of potential liability to civilians must be considered. Civilians initially responsible for empowering or placement of LARs may not 24 necessarily be absolved of legal responsibility should the LAR perform unintended consequences. For example, it is entirely possible that a failure to recognize and obey an attempt for surrender could invoke a violation of the Law of Armed Conflict ("LOAC"). If a civilian software writer failed to initially write code that recognized the right to surrender through a flag of truce or other means, then a "reach back" to civilian liability for the breech might be possible. Likewise, if the civilian software writer failed in attempts to program identifiable legally protected structures such as places of worship, hospitals, or civilian schools, the code writer may be subject to potential liability in those scenarios as well.
The use of smaller yet lethal robots is gaining acceptance in battlefield operations. It is entirely possible that a small three foot or less autonomous robot might be thrown or "launched" into an open building or window with lethal gun-firing capabilities much like a whirling dervish. 29 Should this whirling dervish either not be programmed to accept, or fail to recognize, internationally established symbols of surrender such as a white flag, would the robot's responsible forces, probably including civilian software code writers, escape legal liability for these omissions?
Similarly, well intentioned and seemingly complete software programming might go astray in other ways. Under Law of War concepts, and specifically the Hague Convention (Hague VIII), it is forbidden to lay unanchored automatic contact mines unless they will become harmless at one hour or less after the mines are no longer under the control of the person (nation) who laid them. 30 If one examines unmanned vehicles, particularly unmanned under-water sea vehicles launched from a manned "mother ship," in the event that the mother ship become lost or disabled the unmanned "robotic" ship vehicle must, consistent with international navigational regulations and protocols, be able on its own to comply with the navigational regulations and responsibilities. No matter the degree of robotic autonomy, a legal responsibility is likely to exist for the actions of the untethered "loose" unmanned vehicle.
Consider the situation described by P.W. Singer in "Wired for War" in which a robot programmed to perform sentry work failed to identify a threatening action. 31 29 For example, the TALON robot has been cited by its manufacturer for its extensive use in military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is small and is capable for a variety of uses including the ability to deliver weapons fire. The manufacture's web site specifically states that "TALON's multi-mission family of robots includes one specifically equipped for tactical scenarios frequently encountered by police SWAT units and MPs in all branches of the military. TALON SWAT/MP is a tactical robot that can be configured with a loudspeaker and audio receiver, night vision and thermal cameras and a choice of weapons for a lethal or less-than-lethal response". Available at
In that scenario in which a bar patron suffers from the hiccups, a robot trained to act as a sentry with accompanying lethal force could reasonably fail to identify the well-intentioned http://www.fostermiller.com/lemming.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2010). 30 The Law of War in conjunction with the laying of contact underwater mines is covered in Article I to the Hague Convention VIII; October 18, 1907. Article I states: "It is forbidden -1, To lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after the person who laid them ceases to control them; To lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings; 3. To use torpedoes which do not become harmless when they have missed their mark." Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 U.S.T. 541. 31 Singer, supra note 7, at 81. furtive hand gun gesture of the bartender so that the patron might be scared so as to lose the hiccups. If the robot sentry failed to identify this mimicked hand gun gesture and mistakenly shot the bartender "thinking" a lethal threat existed, it is conceivable that the software writer of the code might be responsible for the mistaken actions.
The above examples illustrate how seemingly complete autonomous robotic systems may still pose legal liability issues upon the civilians initially responsible for their use within battle space operations. Amidst these scenarios, the civilian software code writer's work and ultimate responsibilities may enjoy a much longer and unanticipated legal life.
C. Complexity and Unpredictability
Unfortunately, a full awareness of the risks from autonomous robots may be impossible. Wallach and Allen discuss how predicting the relevant dangers can be fraught with uncertainty. 32 For example, a semi-autonomous anti-aircraft gun accidentally killed several South African soldiers. 33 Roger Clarke pointed out years ago that, "[c]omplex systems are prone to component failures and malfunctions, and to intermodule inconsistencies and misunderstandings."
34 Blay Whitby echoes the notion by arguing that computer programs often do not behave as predictably as software programmers would hope.
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Experts from computing, robotics, and other relevant communities need to continue weighing in on the matter so the reliability of LARs can be more thoroughly assessed.
Perhaps robot ethics has not received the attention it needs, given a common misconception that robots will do only what we have programmed them to do. Unfortunately, such a belief is sorely outdated, harking back to a time when computers were simpler and their programs could be written and understood by a single person. Now, programs with millions of lines of code are written by teams of programmers, none of whom knows the entire program; hence, no individual can predict the effect of a given command with absolute certainty, since portions of large programs may interact in unexpected, untested ways. Even straightforward, simple rules such as Asimov's Laws of Robotics can create unexpected dilemmas. 36 Furthermore, increasing complexity may lead to emergent behaviors, i.e., behaviors not programmed but arising out of sheer complexity.
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Related major research efforts also are being devoted to enabling robots to learn from experience. Learning may enable the robot to respond to novel situations, an apparent blessing given the impracticality and impossibility of predicting all eventualities on the 32 designer's part. But this capability raises the question of whether it can be predicted with reasonable certainty what the robot will learn. Arguably, if a robot's behavior could be adequately predicted, the robot would just be programmed to behave in certain ways in the first place instead of requiring learning. Thus, unpredictability in the behavior of complex robots is a major source of worry, especially if robots are to operate in unstructured environments, rather than the carefully-structured domain of a factory or test laboratory.
D. Just-War Theory
An overarching concern is whether the use of LARs is consistent with timehonored principles, rules, and codes that guide military operations, including just war theory, the Law of Armed Conflict ("LOAC"), and the Rules of Engagement. Scholars are already starting to analyze whether LARs will be capable of fulfilling the requirements of just war theory. Noel Sharkey, for example, doubts that robots will be capable of upholding the principle of discrimination, which involves being able to distinguish between combatants and non-legitimate targets such as civilians and surrendering soldiers. 38 While discussing military robots and the principle of proportionality, Sparrow argues that "decisions about what constitutes a level of force proportionate to the threat posed by enemy forces are extremely complex and context dependent and it is seemingly unlikely that machines will be able to make these decisions reliably for the foreseeable future." Further, Asaro examines whether military robots may actually encourage wars by altering pre-conflict proportionality calculations and last resort efforts. 40 A fundamental impediment to war is the loss of human life, especially the lives of fellow citizens; casualties are a significant reason why wars are not more common. Sending an army of machines to war-rather than friends and relatives-may not exact the same physical and emotional toll on a population. 41 Assuming the existence of a just cause, one could celebrate this new calculus, which more readily permits legitimate self-defense. However, this reduced cost may, in turn, reduce the rigor with which non-violent alternatives are pursued and thus encourage unnecessary-and therefore unjust-wars. While this possible moral hazard obviously does not require us to maximize war costs, it does require efforts to inform and monitor national security decision-makers.
Finally, Singer suggests that these LARs weapons could undermine counterinsurgency efforts, where indigenous respect and trust is crucial to creating a reasonable chance of success. Any decisions and policies regarding military development and use of LARs will impact, and be impacted by, broader technological and social considerations. 46 The failure to acknowledge these considerations upfront, and include them in the analysis, can lead to dysfunctional results, and unnecessary failure of legal and policy initiatives. Accordingly, we will highlight some relevant considerations, and their potential implications.
Consider first what an LAR actually is: one of many potential functions platformed on a generic technology base, which itself may be highly variable. Thus, a "lethal" function, such as a repeating kinetic weapon mounted on a robotic system, is one that is intentionally programmed to identify, verify, and eliminate a human target. At other times, the same basic robotic system might be fitted for cargo carrying capacity, for surveillance, or for many other functions, either in a military or a civil capacity. "Autonomous" means that the platform is capable of making the necessary decisions on its own, without intervention from a human. This, again, may involve the lethality function, or it may not: one might, for example, tell a cargo robot to find the best way to a particular destination, and simply let it go. 47 Similarly, "robot" may sound obvious, but it is not. Tracked machines such as the Talon or PackBot, or UAVs such as the Predator or Raven, are fairly obvious robotic technologies, but what about "smart" land mines that are inert until they sense the proper triggering conditions and are capable of jumping, or exploding, or doing whatever else they 43 Id. at 37-38. 44 And what about a grid of surveillance/attack cybersects (insect size robots or cyborgs consisting of biological insects with robotic functions integrated into them)? Each cybersect taken alone may be too insignificant dumb to be considered a robot, but the cybersect grid as a whole may actually be quite intelligent. 50 Going one step further, what should we call a weapons platform that is wirelessly connected directly into a remote human brain (in recent experiments, a monkey at Duke University with a chip implanted in its brain that wirelessly connected it to a robot in Japan kept the Japanese robot running by thought, so that the robot was in essence an extension of its own physicality)?
51 Even now, the Aegis computer fire control system deployed on Navy vessels has the capacity to be set to fire automatically with limited or no human control.
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This brief digression raises serious questions about what an LAR actually is. Certainly, it has a technology component, but in some ways this is almost trivial compared to its social, political, ethical, and cultural dimensions. In fact, one might well argue that in many important ways a LAR is more of a cultural construct than a technology, with its meaningful dimension being intent rather than the technology system.
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This is an important point, for it suggests that any legal or regulatory approach that focuses on technology may be misplaced; conversely, it means that the underlying technologies which come together in an LAR will continue to evolve independent or irrespective of any direct controls on LARs -including the functionality of the physical hardware, the sophistication of the software, and the integrated technological capability we call "autonomy."
It is because the technologies are separate from the use that the discussion of LARs is frequently confused: LARs are often discussed as if they were a "military technology," when in fact they are a set of technologies that can be integrated in ways that are effective and desirable given current military conditions. Let us begin by identifying two levels at which technologies function: Level I, or the shop floor level; and Level II, or the institutional and social system level. encourage economic growth because of better health, it is a Level II system: use of vaccines may contribute to such a goal, but there are many intervening systems, pressures, policies, and institutions. To return to LARs, then, one might begin by asking why deploy such a technology in any form? Here, one has serious coupling between Level I and Level II issues. The immediate Level I response is that deployment of LARs would save soldiers' lives on the side that deployed them; many explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan that might otherwise have killed and maimed soldiers have been identified, and eliminated, by robots. But this is in some ways only begging a serious Level II question. In World War I, for example, generals thought little of killing 100,000 men at a go by sending them into the teeth of concentrated machine gun fire. Consequently, simply avoiding casualties is an inadequate explanation. That world, however, has changed, especially for the U.S. military, which faces a particularly stark dilemma. It is charged by its citizens with being able to project force anywhere around the world, under virtually any conditions. But, for a number of reasons, American civilians have become increasingly averse to any casualties. So the U. S. military finds itself in the dilemma of being required to project its power without American soldiers dying. Additionally, the long term demographics are not good: Americans, like other developed countries, are looking at an aging demographic, with the immediate implication that there are less young people to fill boots on the ground.
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The institutional and social context of military operations for the United States is increasingly one where better military productivity becomes paramount, with productivity measured as mission accomplishment per soldier lost. And robots can potentially contribute significantly to achieving such productivity. It's not just about saving soldier's lives, a Level I technology. It's also about building the capability to continue to project power with fewer casualties, and to do so because culture and society are changing to make fatalities, whether soldier or civilian, less acceptable, which are Level II trends.
In sum, LARS raise a broad range of complex ethical and social issues, which have only begun to address here. Suffice it to say, though, that any attempt to regulate or govern such technology systems must address these issues in addition to the more concrete technological and legal issues. The various models available to attempt this task are discussed in the following sections. The United States is not a party to all of these conventions, and to the extent their requirements do not rise to the level of customary international law, the United States is not specifically bound by them. On the other hand, the United States has taken considerable interest in the articulation of standards which purport to regulate conduct generally on the battlefield, including how weapons are used. Thus, while no international agreements specifically regulate the use of LARs today, it is possible that such agreements might be negotiated and implemented in the future, as discussed later in this article.
IV. EXISTING GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS FOR MILITARY ROBOTS
In the interim, it bears mention that there are a variety of other potential existing constraints found in military doctrines, professional ethical codes, and public "watch-dog" activities (as well as in international law) that might pertain to the present governance dilemma regarding military robotics. These constraints, generally, were created to address a variety of issues which are not wholly consistent with or applicable to the challenges created by the development and use of robots for military and security purposes. Yet, their existence does provide an architecture upon which to build a system of governance regarding the military use of robots on the battlefield.
As we contemplate employing this existing architecture toward the governance of military robotics, it bears noting that governance systems that are successful in obtaining compliance with a particular policy, rule, or directive share a number of important characteristics. Successful systems of "good governance" involve clearly defined and articulated expectations: that is, they identify the precise problems to be solved, changes to be made, or goals to be sought through governance in straightforward terms. The solutions proposed to these problems, moreover, are realistic: that is, they do not attempt to articulate ideal norms of what ought to be, but rather provide feasible norms describing what can, in fact, be accomplished, under existing political, cultural and legal constraints. Successful systems of governance, moreover, are holistic and inclusive, in the sense that all stakeholders are identified and involved in some fashion in making the rules. Finally, they issue rules or principles that are subject to assessment: that is, the results are capable of measurement and evaluation of effectiveness, in a manner that allows for subsequent amendment and improvement of the requirements when appropriate. 65 If these principles of good governance are not adhered to, expectations and pronouncements often go unheeded. In light of these canons of best practice for good governance, we argue that the goal of technological innovation governance should be to insure that all technological innovation is accomplished within the framework of a culture that respects the long-term effects of such work, while considering, insofar as possible, the likely ramifications of the proposed innovation and development. Appropriate governance should also insure that future end-users or consumers of the specified technological innovations are aware of those ramifications, ideally in the design phase, but at very least well before development or application of the innovations in question. All this should be accomplished, moreover, without placing too heavy of a legislative hand on, nor otherwise discouraging, the creative and competitive energies that generate much-needed innovation.
Measured against the foregoing standards, contemporary governance architecture regarding the innovation and use of military robots would appear wholly inadequate to the task. And yet, there is considerable professional, national and international infrastructure upon which to hang a regime of articulated goals and proscriptions.
At the professional level, for example, there are multiple codes for ethical guidance regarding both best practices and limits on acceptable professional practice for a wide range of academic and professional disciplines. These ethical codes that might conceivably find themselves applied in innovation in the field of robotics, especially for 65 There has been a good deal of discussion in recent years about the subject of good governance, especially in the development area. The United Nations, for example, lists eight characteristics of good governance, which are: consensus oriented, participatory, adherence to the rule of law, effect and efficient, accountable, transparent, responsive, equitable and inclusive. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 'What is Good Governance?' United Nations, 2009, available at http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp (last visited October 4, 2010); see also SAM AGERE, GOOD GOVERNANCE, PROMOTION OF GOOD GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES AND PERSPECTIVES (2000).
participants from professions such as engineering, computer science, biology, medicine, law, and psychology. As a general rule, these ethical codes or guidelines for professional practice are grounded in the traditional responsibilities of their individual professions, and do not contemplate the challenges which can be said to presently exist for innovation generally, or within the field of robotics specifically. Professions, for example, are often regulated at the state level based upon varying degrees of oversight by private organizations and societies. Those codes speak primarily to issues of the professional's relationship and responsibilities toward clients and customers, as well as toward likely competitors, and likewise address important moral and legal issues such as privacy, intellectual property, and education, but often lack any concrete obligations relating to broader social responsibilities for technology development.
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Some of these internal ethical codes also appear to contemplate the future contexts in which professionals will have to operate. upon me may be great, I sign this declaration because I recognize that INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY is the first step on the path to PEACE.
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To date, the most relevant initiative relating to the ethics of military technologies such as robotics is a "Code of Ethics" for robots being proposed by the Republic of South Korea (although the terms of the Code have yet to be fleshed out). 68 The main focus of the charter appears to deal with social problems, such as human control over robots and humans becoming addicted to robot interaction (e.g., using robots as sex toys). 69 The document will purportedly deal with legal issues, such as the protection of data acquired by robots and establishing clear identification and traceability of the machines.
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These internal professional codes and norms are complemented by a host of nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") which contribute to the transparency of innovation programs, especially those performed on behalf of the State. The goals and agendas of these organizations are as varied as their names but their methodologies generally help to educate the end-user or consumer about what is being developed and what the future may portend. Such NGOs often succeed in establishing a record of evidence and impact regarding a particular thread of innovation, and placing this evidence before the public and state funders (legislatures, policy-makers, and appropriate government agencies) and providing news media with the expertise to report on the likely ramifications of proposed technological innovations. 71 An NGO specifically focused on promoting arms control for military robots has recently been formed, called the International Committee for Robot Arms Control ("ICRAC").
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At the national level in the United States, existing governance can be described as decentralized, and in one sense, reactionary. It reflects the push and pull of multiple constituencies and philosophies regarding the efficacy of support for technological innovation. U.S. federal law and regulation reflect the belief that innovation is best encouraged on the one hand by vigorous and unrestrained marketplace competition, 71 An example is the International POPs Elimination Network (IPEN), "a unique global network of people and public interest organizations" that "share a common commitment to achieve a toxic-free future." IPEN,, Welcome to the International POPs Elimination Network, available at http://www.ipen.org/ (last visited October 4, 2010).
IPEN is composed of over 700 public interest health and environmental organizations from more than 80 countries which describes itself as a "global network of more than 700 public nongovernmental organizations working together in over 80 countries. Added to these groups is the literature which has come out of think tanks and academic institutions which speaks to the intersection of ethics and technological innovation.. [T]here are no ethical concerns that are unique to nanotechnology today. That is not to say that nanotechnology does not warrant careful ethical evaluation. As with all new science and technology development, all stakeholders have a shared responsibility to carefully evaluate the ethical, legal, and societal implications raised by novel science and technology developments. However, the[re is] … no apparent need at this time to reinvent fundamental ethical principles or fields, or to develop novel approaches to assessing societal impacts with respect to nanotechnology. 75 Turning to military uses of robotics, specifically, development and use of robots for military purposes continues to be constrained, as mentioned above, by various restrictions regarding the projection of force found in international law, as translated variously into national laws and regulations. There are, as cited above, multiple conventions which purport to deal with specific technologies and practices. Even though the United States is not a party to all of these conventions, nor necessarily bound by all of them, it is nonetheless the case that the U. S. has taken considerable interest in the articulation of standards which purport to regulate conduct generally on the battlefield, including how weapons are used.
There are five principles which run through the language of the various humanitarian law treaties 76 about the relative virtues and vices of contemporary capitalism, it is a fact that progress in science and technology owes much to free enterprise. The possibility of gain adds the fuel of interest to the fire of genius, and even as the profits accrue only to some, the benefits are, at least in principle, available to all. And the competition to succeed provides enormous incentives to innovations, growth, and progress. We have every reason to expect exponential increases in biotechnologies, and, therefore, in their potential uses in all aspect of human life." THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON 76 Humanitarian law is that international law comprised of a set of rules which seek to limit the effect of armed conflict. Primary conventions include the Geneva Conventions of 1949, supplemented by the Additional Protocols of 1977 relating to the protection of victims of honors regarding the conduct of warfare. These are: (i) a general prohibition on the employment of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, (ii) military necessity, (iii) proportionality, (iv) discrimination, and (iv) command responsibility. These principles, as discussed below, impose ethical and arguably legal restraints on at least some uses of lethal autonomous robots.
First, some weapons, it is argued, are patently inhumane, no matter how they are used or what the intent of the user is. This principle has been recognized since at least 1907, 77 although consensus over what weapons fall within this category tends to change over time. The concept here is that some weapons are design-dependent: that is, their effects are reasonably foreseeable even as they leave the laboratory. In 1996, the International Committee of the Red Cross at Montreux articulated a test to determine if a particular weapon would be the type which would foreseeably cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 78 The so-called "SIrUS" criteria would ban weapons when their use would result in:
• A specific disease, specific abnormal physiological state, a specific and permanent disability or specific disfigurement; or
• Field mortality of more than 25% or a hospital mortality of more than 5%; or • Grade 3 wounds as measure by the Red Cross wound classification scale; or • Effects for which there is no well-recognized and proven treatment.
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The operative term here is specific; the criteria speak to technology specifically designed to accomplish more than render an adversary hors de combat. Military necessity recognizes the benefit to friend and foe alike of a speedy end to hostilities. Protracted warfare, it assumes, creates more rather than less suffering for all sides. In order to determine the necessity for the use of a particular technology, then, one needs to know what the definition of victory is, and how to measure the submission of the enemy in order to determine whether the technology will be necessary in this regard.
The third principle, proportionality, is of considerable concern to the developer and user of new technologies. A use of a particular technology is not proportional if the loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. 82 In order to make this determination, it can be argued, one must consider the military necessity of a particular use and evaluate the benefits of that use in furtherance of a specific objective against the collateral damage that may be caused.
Discrimination, the fourth principle, goes to the heart of moral judgment. Indiscriminant attacks (uses) are prohibited under the rules. Indiscriminant uses occur whenever such uses are not directed against a specific military objective, or otherwise employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be directed at a specified military target (indiscriminant bombing of cities for example). Indiscriminate usage also encompasses any method or means of combat, the effects of which cannot be limited as required, or that are otherwise of a nature to strike military and civilian targets without distinction.
A final principle is command responsibility, that principle which exposes a multiple of superiors to various forms of liability for failure to act in the face of foreseeable illegal activities. This is a time-honored principle, grounded on the contract between soldiers and their superiors, which requires soldiers to act and superiors to determine when and how to act. It has a long history reflective of the need for control on the battlefield. A 1997 Protocol to the Geneva Convention requires that each State Party "determine whether the employment of any new weapon, means or method of warfare that it studies, develops, acquires or adopts would, in some or all circumstance, be prohibited by international law." 84 The legal framework for this review is the international law applicable to the State, including international humanitarian law ("IHL"). In particular this consists of the treaty and customary prohibitions and restrictions on specific weapons, as well as the general IHL rules applicable to all weapons, means and methods of warfare. General rules include the principles described above, such as protecting civilians from the indiscriminate effects of weapons and combatants from unnecessary suffering. The assessment of a weapon in light of the relevant rules will require an examination of all relevant empirical information pertinent to the weapon, such as its technical description and actual performance, and its effects on health and the environment. This is the rationale for the involvement of experts of various disciplines in the review process. 85 Once again, the United States is not a signatory to this Protocol and thus, technically not bound by its requirements. Nonetheless, to the extent that it sets out reasonable requirements and methodologies for use by states fielding new and emerging technologies, however, this treaty could well set the standard in international law for what may be considered appropriate conduct. A final constraint worth noting is the emerging trend in international law to hold those responsible for fielding weapons which allegedly contravene the principles enunciated above through the use of litigation based on the concept of universal jurisdiction.
86 While litigation to date has revolved primarily around allegations of practices such as genocide, torture, rendition, and illegal interrogation, there is no reason to believe that future prosecutions may be justified where decisions regarding illegal innovation, adaptation, and use of weapons systems are made.
These various principles and requirements of international humanitarian law and ethical rules of military conduct would clearly impose some limitations on the development and use of lethal autonomous robots. However, given the ambiguous meaning and uncertain legal binding status of these principles, they are unlikely to adequately constrain and shape the development and use of LARs on their own. Additional oversight mechanisms may therefore be warranted, which are further explored in the subsequent section. . 86 The concept of universal jurisdiction is a customary international law norm that permits states to regulate certain conduct to which they have no discernable nexus. Generally, it is recognized as a principle of international law that all states have the right to regulate certain conduct regardless of the location of the offense or the nationalities of the offender or the victims. Piracy, slave trade, war crimes and genocide are all generally accepted subjects of universal jurisdiction. Belgium, Germany and Spain have all entertained such prosecutions. The issue of lawfare is also of concern. Lawfare is a strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve military objectives. 
V. LEGALLY BINDING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
A more formal and traditional approach for oversight of a new weapons category such as LARs would be some form of binding international arms control agreement. 87 Under existing international law, there is no specific prohibition on lethal autonomous robots. In September 2009, robotics expert Noel Sharkey, physicist Jurgen Altmann, bioethicist Robert Sparrow, and philosopher Peter Asaro founded the International Committee for Robot Arms Control ("ICRAC") to campaign for limiting lethal autonomous robots through an international agreement modeled on existing arms control agreements such as those restricting nuclear and biological weapons.
88 ICRAC called for military robots to be barred from space and that all robotic systems should be prohibited from carrying nuclear weapons. 89 The ICRAC is a small group at this time and as of yet its campaign does not yet seem to have gained the momentum necessary to spark a new international legal regime.
However, there is precedent for a non-governmental organization, the International Committee to Ban Landmines, successfully leading the charge towards banning a weapons system.
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While ICRAC's work has raised the issue of limiting lethal autonomous robots through an international arms control agreement, the wisdom of such a course of action is far from clear. Do explicit international legal restrictions on lethal autonomous robots make sense? Are they feasible -both from a political and a technological perspective? Does the ICRAC's specific proposal make sense? The goal of this section is to make some preliminary points about what the options may be for international legal restrictions on lethal autonomous robots, if a policy choice is made to attempt to restrict them.
International law contains a significant number and diversity of precedents for restricting specific weapons. Existing legally-binding arms control agreements and other 87 instruments include a wide variety of different types of restrictions on targeted weapons, including prohibitions and limitations (restrictions that fall short of prohibition) on (i) acquisition, (ii) research and development, (iii) testing, (iv) deployment, (v) transfer or proliferation, and (vi) use.
These various types of prohibitions and limitations form a kind of menu from which the drafters of an international legal instrument addressing lethal autonomous robots -or other emerging warfighting technologies --could choose in accordance with their goals and the parameters of political support for such restrictions. A similar menu could be created of the various types of monitoring, verification, dispute resolution, and enforcement mechanisms that implement the prohibitions and limitations contained in existing international legal arms control instruments.
These prohibitions and limitations (as well as any accompanying monitoring/verification, dispute resolution, and enforcement provisions) can be contained in any of a number of different types of international legal instruments. They are typically contained in legally binding multilateral agreements, including in multilateral agreements primarily focused on arms control and also in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. However, there are also examples of prohibitions and limitations contained in legally binding bilateral agreements, as well as examples of prohibitions and limitations contained in legally binding resolutions of the United Nations Security Council or in customary international law (which consists of rules of law derived from the consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law required them to act that way). As with the content of the restrictions and their implementing provisions, the choice of type of instrument depends on the drafters' goals and the parameters of political support for the desired restrictions and implementing provisions.
New international legal arms control instruments are typically free-standing. However, there is also at least one existing multilateral legal framework agreement with respect to which it is worth exploring whether that agreement could usefully be amended to itself provide a vehicle for some or all desired restrictions on lethal autonomous robots. This is the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (the CCW), 91 which has been ratified by over 100 states parties.
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The operative provisions of the CCW are contained within its protocols. The five protocols currently in force contain rules for the protection of military personnel and, particularly civilians and civilian objects from injury or attack under various conditions by means of: fragments that cannot readily be detected in the human body by x-rays (Protocol I), landmines and booby traps (amended Protocol II), incendiary weapons (Protocol III), blinding lasers (Protocol IV), and explosive remnants of war (Protocol V). It is worth noting that the case that lethal autonomous robots should be restricted by the CCW could be made most effectively if it were argued that such robots are contrary to the "principle," cited in the CCW preamble, "that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/40BDE99D98467348C12571DE00 60141E/$file/CCW+text.pdf. 92 See, e.g., Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) At a Glance, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/CCW. 93 Id.
projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering." 94 
A. Menu of Types of Restrictions Contained in Current International
Legal Arms Control Instruments Some international legal arms control instruments prohibit a full range of activities involving the targeted weapons. For example, States-parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, typically referred to as the "Mine Ban Treaty," commit to not developing, producing, acquiring, retaining, stockpiling, or transferring anti-personnel landmines. 95 The following menu contains additional examples of existing international legal instruments which adopt the specified types of restrictions on a narrower basis:
Prohibitions and Limitations on Acquisition
Several international legal arms control instruments completely prohibit the acquisition of targeted weapons. For example, the Biological Weapons Convention ("BWC") prohibits all state-parties from acquiring, producing, developing, stockpiling, or retaining --and requires all state-parties to within nine months destroy or divert to peaceful purposes --1) biological agents and toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;" and 2) weapons, equipment and delivery vehicles "designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile weapons or in armed conflict."
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The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction ("CWC") prohibits all state parties from producing or acquiring, as well as developing, stockpiling or retaining, chemical weapons. 97 In contrast, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("NPT") creates two classes of states with regard to nuclear weapons. 98 Nuclear-weapon state parties are those which had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 99 their nuclear weapons, but does require those parties to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." 100 Non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT are prohibited from receiving, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons.
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The Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions 102 provides a very different model, with a focus on transparency rather than prohibition of acquisitions. The Convention does not prohibit any acquisitions but does require its states-parties to annually report on their imports of certain specified heavy weapons, as well as submit notifications within 90 days of their incorporation of certain specified heavy weapons into their armed forces inventory, whether those weapons were imported or produced domestically. 103 
Prohibitions and Limitations on Research and Development
Few, if any, international legal arms control instruments prohibit all research that could be useful for targeted weapons. Limitations on development differ from instrument to instrument. The CWC flatly prohibits the development of all chemical weapon munitions and devices. 104 In contrast, the BWC contains a more nuanced prohibition, banning the development, production, acquisition, and retention of 1) microbial or other biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes" and 2) weapons, equipment or means of delivery "designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict." 105 It is important to note that restrictions based on quantities or intended use rather than the underlying nature of the technology can be exceptionally difficult to verify, at least without highly intrusive inspections.
Prohibitions and Limitations on Testing
Prohibitions and limitations on testing of targeted weapons are most prominent in the nuclear weapons context.
For example, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ("CTBT"), which has not yet entered into force, prohibits "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." 106 The CTBT's entry into force awaits ratification by nine key countries, including the United States. In contrast, the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (also known as the "Limited Test Ban Treaty") ---which unlike the CTBT is in force -specifically prohibits nuclear weapons tests "or any other nuclear explosion" only in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. 108 The Limited Test Ban Treaty also prohibits nuclear explosions in all other environments, including underground, if they cause "radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control" the explosions were conducted. 109 
4.
Prohibitions and Limitations on Deployment Some international legal arms control instruments focus on limiting deployment of the targeted weapons, such as with overall or regional numerical caps. For example, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, entered into by the U.S. and Russia in 2002, requires the two countries to reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012. 110 The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, ratified by the United States in 1992, contains bloc and regional limits on deployment of certain weapons. 111 
Prohibitions and Limitations on Transfer/Proliferation
Many international legal arms control instruments include prohibitions or limitations on transfer or other proliferation of the targeted weapons. For example, the NPT prohibits parties that possess nuclear weapons from transferring the weapons to any recipient as well as from assisting, encouraging, or inducing any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire such weapons in any way.
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The CWC bans the direct or indirect transfer of chemical weapons. 113 The CWC also bans assisting, encouraging, or inducing anyone to engage in CWC-prohibited activity. Similarly, the BWC bans the transfer to any recipient, directly or indirectly, and assisting any state, group of states, or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire 1) biological agents and toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;" and 2) weapons, equipment and delivery vehicles "designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile weapons or in armed conflict." 115 In contrast, the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions does not prohibit exports but does require its statesparties to annually report on their exports of certain specified heavy weapons. 116 
Prohibitions and Limitations on Use
Several international legal arms control instruments include prohibitions or limitations on use of the targeted weapons. The International Court of Justice, in its 1996 advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ruled that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law; However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake." 117 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court prohibits 1) employing poison or poisoned weapons, 2) employing poisonous gases, and 3) employing bullets which flatten or expand easily in the human body.
118 This list is potentially expandable. While the CWC bans chemical weapons use or military preparation for use, 119 the BWC does not ban the use of biological and toxin weapons but reaffirms the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits such use.
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Protocol IV of the CCW prohibits the use of lasers specifically designed to cause permanent blindness.
121 It further obliges states-parties to make every effort to avoid causing permanent blindness through the use of other lasers. 122 While prohibiting the use of blinding lasers, the convention does not rule out their development or stockpiling. It is worth noting that even the broadest and most aggressively implemented international legal arms control instruments suffer from certain inherent weaknesses. For example, existing international legal arms control instruments only apply to states. Their impact on non-state actors is at best indirect (for example, the CWC and BWC require state parties to prohibit activities on their territory that are prohibited directly for them non-state actors, particularly transnational terrorist groups, may present a significant threat of utilizing lethal autonomous robots. In addition, these international legal arms control instruments typically require state consent -states can choose not to ratify these agreements and can withdraw from them if they do join.
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VI. SOFT LAW/GOVERNANCE APPROACHES
There have been a number of proposed strategies for managing the risks and regulating the uses of emerging military technologies. 126 Those strategies vary in formality and scope. Proposed measures range from formal, binding agreements such as treaties to informal initiatives such as codes of conduct.
127 Oversight of lethal autonomous robots likely falls towards the latter end if this spectrum at least initially, in that some form of coordinated international oversight is warranted, but formal, "hard law" treaties may not be practicable, at least in the short term.
In a growing number of areas of international oversight, ranging from environmental to commercial to social to military issues, traditional "hard law" treaties and agreements are being supplemented or in some cases displaced by new "soft law" approaches.
128 "Soft law" approaches seek to create and implement substantive principles or norms without creating enforceable legal requirements. The traditional model of binding international regulation that relies on formal treaties negotiated by government officials has a number of limitations, including the excessive resources and time needed to negotiate a formal international agreement, problems in enforcement of and compliance with such agreements, and the lack of flexibility and responsiveness in adapting such instruments to changing circumstances.
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Many new models of international oversight or harmonization have been developed to circumvent such problems. These new models tend to be more flexible and reflexive, capable of being launched relatively quickly and adapted easily to changing technological, political and security landscapes. These new soft law approaches have their own limitations, including perhaps most importantly that they are not as binding and often specific as traditional legal agreements. Yet, their growing popularity is due to advantages 125 Arms control prohibitions or restrictions imposed by legally binding United Nations Security Council ("UNSC") resolutions, such as UNSCR 1540, differ from this model. A resolution approved by the UNSC under its Chapter VII authorities is legally binding on all UN member states, whether or not they supported the resolution. In addition, such a resolution typically cannot be rescinded or amended without the acquiescence of all five permanent members of the UNSC (China, France, Russia, UK, and US). Customary international laws are another form of international law that can in some circumstances bind states without their approval and from which states are in some circumstances not permitted to withdraw. 126 such as the relative ease by which they can be adopted and updated, and the broader roles they create for stakeholders to participate in their substantive formulation. 130 Some of the key soft law/governance approaches that have been applied in other areas of emerging technologies that could conceivably be adapted to military use of robotics are briefly described below.
Codes of Conduct
Codes of conduct are non-binding and often somewhat general guidelines defining responsible, ethical behavior and which are intended to promote a culture of responsibility. They can be developed and implemented by a variety of different entities, including governmental agencies, industry groups, individual companies, professional or scientific societies, non-governmental organizations, or collaborative partnerships involving two or more of these entities.
One of the first, and possibly most successful, codes of conduct was at the outset of the field of genetic engineering. The Asilomar guidelines on recombinant DNA research were adopted in the 1970s in response to safety concerns about some early genetic engineering experiments. 131 These guidelines were initially developed by scientists based on discussions at a 1975 conference held at Asilomar, California, were subsequently adopted into more binding guidelines (at least for funding recipients) by the National Institutes of Health in 1976, and were widely complied with by scientists around the world. 132 More recently, codes of conduct have emerged at the forefront of discussions to restrict the use of genetic engineering to create new biological weapons. 133 Although there are concerns that unenforceable codes of conduct will not provide strong enough assurances against the creation of new genetically engineered biological weapons, they may play an important bridging role in providing some initial protection and governance until more formal legal instruments can be negotiated and implemented. 134 In the same way, codes of conduct may play a similar transitional role in establishing agreed-upon principles for the military use of robots.
Codes of conduct are being created for other emerging technologies with potential military applications. The areas of synthetic biology and nanotechnology are two examples. In synthetic biology three different groups have recently proposed competing codes of conduct to manage security implications. 135 The groups are the U.S. Government, the International Association Synthetic Biology (IASB), and the International gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC). 136 This proliferation of competing codes flags a key question about who has the authority and influence to promulgate effective codes of conduct that relevant parties will comply with. A number of codes of conduct have also been created in the field of nanotechnology. The .first code was developed by the Foresight Institute in the form of "guidelines," with a primary objective of discouraging the creation and deployment of autonomous replication nanosystems. 137 The Foresight Institute guidelines have since been updated six times, 138 demonstrating the flexibility and adaptivity that is possible with codes of conduct which can be relatively easily updated (at least compared with a treaty or other more formal instrument). The current Foresight guidelines are extremely thorough and address issues and implications of nanotechnology in professional, industry, military, health, policy and other contexts. 139 The guidelines are based on the premise that professional ethics and soft law measures can be at least as effective as hard law in promoting safe practices. 140 The drafters of the Foresight guidelines also recognize the value in promoting the least restrictive legal alternative while developing good practices in areas of emerging technology. 141 The European Union recently adopted a code of conduct for nanotechnology researchers. 142 The code promotes a responsible and open approach to research conducted within a safe, ethical and effective framework. 143 Regular monitoring and revision of the code will occur in order to keep the code current with advances in nanoscience and nanotechnology. 144 Another nanotechnology code of conduct originating in Europe, but with international applicability, is the Responsible NanoCode. 145 The Responsible Nanocode is an example of a code of conduct developed as a result of significant collaboration and designed to reach a wide target audience. The creators are United Kingdom's Royal Society, a nanotechnology industry trade group and a public interest organization. 146 The code is for companies that handle nanomaterials and the specific objective of the code is to "establish a consensus of good practice in the research, production, retail and disposal of products using nanotechnologies." 147 The code was developed to be universally applicable; it was devised "to be adopted by organisations in any part of the world, under any regulatory regime." 148 Much of the discourse concerning codes of conduct tend to refer to codes of conduct as a single concept with a singular meaning or interpretation. But codes of conduct can exist on a continuum with respect to their objectives, specificity, audience, and expectations of compliance. The goal of all codes is to affect behavior, but different types of codes seek to shape behavior in different ways. 149 There are actually three primary types of codes: codes of ethics, codes of conduct, and codes of practice. 150 Codes of ethics entail professionalism; codes of conduct espouse guidelines of appropriate behavior; codes of practice embody practices to be enforced. 151 Many commonly referred to codes of conduct may, in reality, be a combination of two or even all three types of codes.
The principal benefit of codes of conduct may not be the codes themselves, but rather the educational and cooperation-building effects of working on developing a code. 152 So, notwithstanding the ultimate utility and efficacy (or lack thereof) of a code, the production of the code itself may have expressive value. The discussion and collaboration required to develop a code raises awareness of relevant issues and prompts dialogue between relevant parties. 153 It is important that individuals, institutions and countries are aware of their ethical obligations. 154 Once a code is created it can help achieve that end by being a valuable educational tool. 155 It is critical that countries are aware of other countries' intentions and limits when it comes to the use of autonomous robots, and so it is reasonable to expect that the exercise of attempting to develop a code of conduct addressing these issues could have both utility and educational benefits.
Even though their tangible outcomes may be hard to identify, measure and quantify, codes of conduct possess unique features which make them attractive informal measures. The multiple codes of conduct that exist in the synthetic biology and nanotechnology industries highlight some of the salient benefits and drawbacks of codes of conduct. In terms of benefits, they can be created rather quickly -compared to the time it would take to develop formal legal regulations -they can be drafted by interested parties who are knowledgeable in the area and they can be customized to address unique properties of a technology. On the other hand, there can be difficulties in application. Because anyone can craft a code of conduct, when multiple codes are introduced into an area, whose code takes precedent? There is no hierarchal relationship amongst codes of conduct that would provide a clear sense of priority. The strengths of codes of conduct and other soft law mechanisms -being voluntary, cooperative, flexible measures comes at a price: they have no rank order; they are all on the same playing field.
Despite sounding like a straightforward concept, it is not a simple process to create a code of conduct. Drafting a comprehensive, appropriate and effective code requires a thorough consideration of a myriad of issues, attention to detail as well as a proper balancing of the policy interests of interested parties. 156 While a code of conduct will not likely be sufficient to ensure the appropriate and ethical use of autonomous military robots, the process of creating and disseminating such a code is undeniably a step forward and can be an important piece or at least starting point of eventual treaty or agreement in this area. 157 Transgovernmental Dialogue "Transgovernmental dialogue" refers to a growing number of informal and flexible arrangements under which governmental officials from different countries meet on a regular basis to discuss and coordinate polices. These opportunities for discussion provide a forum to share information and 'best practices,' to seek to harmonize policies and oversight mechanisms, to coordinate enforcement practices, and to help anticipate, prevent and resolve inter-national disputes. 158 Through these practices, transgovernmental dialogue can greatly enhance cooperation and influence policy outcomes. It achieves that end through collaborative mechanisms and countries' shared desire to address a common problem or goal. These types of dialogues are beneficial to the nations involved and are becoming increasingly common in areas requiring international coordination, with national security issues being a prime example. 159 They offer "a structure that is less threatening to democratic governance than private transnational action and less costly than inter-state negotiations, yet they can lay a firm foundation for harmonized national regulation and even, if appropriate, for international regulation." 160 An example of a transgovernmental dialogue in the national security context is the Australia Group, which is an informal forum of officials from forty-one nations with a common interest in preventing proliferation of materials that could be used for chemical or biological weapons. Arising out of the experiences of the Iraq/Iran war of the late 1980s, the Australia Group was chiefly concerned with the use of chemical and biological weapons deployed in that conflict, but the Group has subsequently developed a list of dual These various examples of transnational dialogue are effective in starting a discussion among policymakers from different nations, and are relatively easy and quick to implement. The only major requirement is a sponsoring organization or nation to convene at least the initial meeting. While not usually creating any binding international policies themselves, such dialogue initiatives can be an important first step to more concrete policy measures in the future, and may serve a useful function in that regard to start the dialogue amongst government policymakers on international policies for military robots.
Information Sharing and Confidence-Building Measures
Various types of information sharing and other confidence building measures have been used to enhance stability, trust and security for a variety of problems, including in the military and national security contexts. Information-sharing and confidence-building measures ("CBMs") can be adopted unilaterally or can be coordinated or negotiated among several parties. The concept of CBMs arose in the sphere of international relations, and such measures are frequently used in international conflicts as the initial steps for reducing hostilities between enemies. In this international context, CBMs usually involve some mix of communication, constraint, transparency, or verification measures. Information sharing mechanisms are one type of CBM. An example of legally-implemented information sharing mechanism is the Biosafety Clearinghouse adopted under the Cartagena Protocol to the U.N. Convention on Biodiversity, which creates a web-based portal that provides a forum for nations to share information on scientific, risk, regulatory, legal and ethical determinations from each nation.
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One could envision a variety of potential CBDs for military robotics, consisting of either unilateral or multilateral initiatives. For example, individual or groups of nations could commit to a limited moratorium on the deployment of such systems. Nations could share information on technical issues with regard to lethal autonomous robots, including issues relating to potential compliance and verification of any future international agreement concerning LARs. Nations could even take relatively minor but helpful steps by convening an international conference to discuss the issue of LARs.
Framework Convention
A final potential soft law mechanism, which is really more of a hybrid between soft law and the more formal international agreements discussed in the previous section, is a framework agreement or convention. A framework convention, at its most basic level, creates a process and an institutional basis for gradually developing a more substantive international agreement. It consists of an initial agreement to create the framework agreement, often with little or no substantive "teeth" originally, but which sets in place an annual meeting of representatives of the participating nations, perhaps a small secretariat to manage the process, and provisions for negotiating and adopting more substantive Protocols that member nations can then consider ratifying on an individual basis. For example, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer began as a rather weak agreement, but was gradually strengthened by various additions and protocols over time such as the Montreal Protocol and its amendments. Other prominent examples of such framework agreements include the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Framework Convention on Tobacco.
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Convention on Biological Diversity, Biosafety Clearinghouse, available at http://bch.cbd.int/ (last visited October 11, 2010).
While the lack of substantive content at the outset may seem a weakness of such agreements, it has the benefit of thereby being non-threatening to uncertain or recalcitrant states who may otherwise be reluctant to sign onto any international agreement because of major scientific or technological uncertainties or differences in perspective or distrust of other participating states. Once the nations agree to participate in the framework agreement, the process that is created can be the vehicle for greater convergence of positions and building of trust going forward, opening the door for more substantive commitments on an incremental basis. Thus, a framework agreement provides several potential benefits to states, including to:
• acknowledge that a problem may exist, legitimating it as an international concern;
• draw the attention of relevant experts, interest groups, and the public to the problem; • commit themselves to take, or at least consider, more substantive action if the problem proves to be sufficiently serious; and
• demonstrate that they are taking the issue seriously.
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In addition to these benefits, the framework agreement can sometimes involve more concrete steps such as the establishment of technical or scientific committees that can provide important for a for understanding and cooperating on such issues, and potentially the inclusion of reporting and other information-sharing mechanisms that can improve transparency on an issue. All of these mechanisms and benefits would potentially be timely and useful for addressing LARs.
VII. CONCLUSION
Many years ago, David Collinridge recognized a fundamental tension in the governance of new technologies -prior to the development and deployment of the technology, not enough is known about the potential risks of that technology to warrant or guide any restrictions or limitations, whereas once the technology has been developed and deployed, it is often too late to undertake meaningful regulations because the commercial momentum behind the technology is now too strong and entrenched to sway. 173 Lethal autonomous robotics offers an opportunity to break this cycle. Enough concern and information exists now to consider appropriate governance models in a timely and proactive manner. Yet, the time to take action is short before the current window of opportunity to design a relevant governance or oversight system for LARs closes.
The need to take action on LARs is therefore urgent and timely. This article has not tried to prescribe a specific action or form of oversight, but rather has sought to identify the range of possible governance mechanisms that can be brought to bear on this problem. This can range from ethical principles implemented through modifications or refinements of national policies, law of war and rules of engagement, international treaties or agreements, or a variety of other "soft law" governance mechanisms. Of course, any governance approach need not be restricted to any one of these modes of oversight, but could involve a combination of two or more approaches. The critical point is that discussions on these options, at both national and international levels, must advance promptly if we are to successfully manage the technological convergence of rapidly advancing robotics technology with military needs, incentives and temptations.
